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Chapter 1 
1. A skeptic might blame the Great Depression for the stability in the earnings ratio; 
as is evident in Figure 1.1, the ratio declined slightly in the 1930s. However, no such 
explanation can account for the failure of the earnings ratio to rise in the 1920s. 
2.  My focus throughout is on men because comparable figures for women have not 
been calculated; based on an analysis of occupation statistics, however, Goldin (1990) 
suggests that the relative economic status of black women may have deteriorated be- 
fore World War Two. 
3.  There is considerable debate over the proper interpretation of the increase in the 
earnings ratio from 1940 to 1980; a useful introduction to the issues are various chap- 
ters in Shulman and Darity (1989). There is little debate, however, that the “new” black 
middle class is much larger in size that the “old” black middle class of forty years ago, 
and that middle class blacks today are employed in a broader array of jobs than in the 
past. Relative improvements in black status slowed after  1975; see Heckman (1990, 
243). 
4. By contrast, the Great Depression was a negative shock, slowing the absorption 
of black labor into the nonfarm economy. 
5.  Here “educational attainment” means highest grade of school completed, or what 
is commonly meant by the phrase “years of schooling.” The racial difference is defined 
to be the white mean minus the black mean. This difference is always positive for the 
cohorts analyzed by Smith (1984). 
6.  The coefficient of the schooling gap is  -0.031  with a t-statistic of  -6.51.  The 
dependent variable is the cohort-specific black-white earnings ratio (Smith 1984, 695); 
the independent variables are the schooling gap, white minus black (687), plus dummy 
variables for census years (1900,  1920-1980;  data for  1910 are not available,  see 
Smith 1984,693). 
7.  In Chapter 4,  however, I analyze racial differences in wages paid to teachers, and 
in chapters 6 and 7 present some evidence on racial differences in earnings from the 
1940 and 1950 public use samples. 
8.  Smith’s (1984) earnings ratios, shown in Figure 1.1, were derived from employ- 
ment categories. Smith assigned fixed weights (using 1970 census data on earnings) to 
the proportions of individuals in particular occupations. The sum of the weighted pro- 
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portions yields an index of “occupational status,” and the black-to-white ratio of occu- 
pational status is Smith’s estimate of the earnings ratio. Thus changes in Smith’s proxy 
reflect shifts in the occupations held by black men relative to white men; shifts in the 
structure of wages are ignored. 
9.  A good example involves the analysis of region of employment in Chapter 7. In 
an earnings function analysis of  racial differences, region would be an independent 
variable: other things held constant (e.g.,  age, educational attainment), blacks living 
in the South had lower wages.  The earnings function approach  fails to address  an 
underlying question: if living in the South was so costly to blacks in terms of earnings, 
why didn’t more blacks move to the North? Posing the question in this manner, as I do 
in Chapter 7, goes to the heart of the debate between the institutionalist and human 
capital models. 
A limitation of analyses of employment rather than earnings is that effects of school- 
ing on earnings within occupations are ignored. This is an important criticism, but until 
more earnings data are found for the early twentieth century, the criticism cannot be 
addressed. 
10.  See Heckman and Payner (1989) and Butler, Heckman, and Payner (1989). 
Chapter 2 
1.  Slave artisans residing in southern cities and towns may be an exception to the 
general rule.  According to the  1870 census manuscripts,  fully 22 percent of urban 
black artisans were literate, compared with only 5.7 percent of rural southern blacks 
(Ransom and Sutch  1977).  Slave artisans made many economic decisions on their 
own, frequently hiring themselves out. 
2.  Strictly speaking, cohort here refers to blacks born in the South in a certain time 
period and remaining in the South, not to all southern blacks born in the time period. 
3.  In 1910 and after, a person was counted as “in school” if he attended school for 
at least one day during the census year. A number of adjustments, however, had to be 
made to the census data for 1880-1900.  A question comparable to the one in 1910 was 
included in the  1880 census form, but the results were not compiled.  Instead, the 
published volumes include figures derived from reports of  school superintendents. At- 
tendance rates derived from school reports  generally exceed those compiled by the 
census, because the school reports include a substantial amount of double-counting of 
enrollments. I devised a procedure to estimate black school attendance in 1880 from 
child literacy rates (see the notes to Table 2.2). Although I believe the estimates to be 
plausible, they should be interpreted with care. It is important to note that the census 
data refer to attendance at a school of any type-public  or private, vocational, and so 
on. For the younger age groups, however, the vast amount of attendance took place in 
public schools, because private school enrollments were a small fraction of total en- 
rollments. 
4.  In 1940  and 1950 the specific period was shorter in length than before 1940. Had 
the 1940 or 1950 census question been used consistently throughout the period, the 
increase over time in black  school attendance rates would have been larger than as 
measured in Table 2.2; some black children who attended school in 1910 would not 
have been so counted had the 1940 (or 1950) question been asked. 
5. The distinction between “years of schooling” in the literal sense of time spent in 
school, and “years of schooling” as a measure of grades completed (i.e., a certain level 
of knowledge) is discussed later in the chapter. 
6.  Using the procedure to estimate literacy rates in 1940 and 1950, had every black 
male attended 4.5 years of school ca. 1890, virtually all would have been classified as 
literate. 137  Notes to Pages 16-34 
7. This explanation is similar to Goldin’s (1990) analysis of female labor force par- 
ticipation and labor market experience.  After World War Two the labor force partici- 
pation rate of married  women increased sharply, but average years of  labor market 
experience among women in the labor force remained low.  Average experience re- 
mained low by the addition to the labor force of women with little or no work experi- 
ence since marriage. 
8. White years-per-grade is biased upwards because grade includes foreign whites 
who were less educated than native whites. Thus census data also overstate schooling 
for whites. 
9. Calculated from figures in Jones (1917, 7). 
10. There were sixty-seven high schools, if Missouri and Kansas are included; see 
11. Computed from U.S. Bureau of Education (1893). 
12.  “Plantation” agriculture  was a term used by the U.S.  Bureau of  the Census 
(1916) to describe the situation in which a large number of farmers operated separate 
units under the direction of a single landlord. Plantation counties produced staple crops 
(such as cotton), had high labor-to-land ratios and little mechanization, high rates of 
tenancy, and were predominantly black. 
13. One should not conclude, however, that the equal part of separate-but-equal was 
a real possibility in 1954. There were still large differences in expenditures on ancillary 
services, such as transportation, and the value of school capital per black child was far 
below that per white child. 
14. I have focussed my attention on public elementary and secondary schools be- 
cause that is where the majority of southerners, black or white, were educated during 
the first half  of the twentieth  century,  and because  comprehensive data on private 
schools are unavailable. For further discussion of the relative quality of black schools 
in  the South during the segregation era, see Bond (1934, 1939), Harlan (1958), and 
especially Anderson (1987). 
15. Racial differences in class sizes would be considerably larger if expressed on 
the basis of enrollment rather than average daily attendance. 
16. See Center for Studies  in Demography  and Ecology  (1980, 35). Fractional 
months were not retained in the public use sample; it appears that the answers were 
rounded up. Thus the estimated average months of school attendance are biased up- 
ward, but the degree of upward bias cannot be determined from the sample. 
17. This was the procedure used in the 1940 census. Census clerks in Washington 
were instructed that, if the school attendance question was left blank, column 25 of the 
census form was to be checked. Then, if an “S” (for student) appeared in column 25, a 
“Yes” was to be entered in the school attendance column as well. 




1. See Jones (1917), Bond (1934, 1939), Harlan (1958), Kousser (1974, 1980a), 
Pritchett (1985, 1986), and Anderson (1987). 
2. The discussion in this section is woven together from a number of sources. The 
best  historical  account  of  disenfranchisement  is  Kousser  (1974); see also  Bloom 
(1987). Foner (1988) is a recent synthesis of scholarship on Reconstruction. 
3.  Other disenfranchisement methods included the “whites-only” primary and the 
“Australian” or secret ballot. The introduction of the secret ballot in Arkansas, which 
was especially effective in eliminating illiterates, prompted the following ditty (quoted 
in Kousser 1974, 54): 138  Notes to Pages 34-45 
The Australian Ballot works like a charm 
It makes them think and scratch, 
and  when a Negro gets a ballot 
He certainly has his match. 
4.  “Decimate” here does not mean completely eliminate.  There were areas in the 
ex-Confederate South in which blacks voted after disenfranchisement, such as Atlanta; 
see Dittmer (1977). Blacks were freer to vote in border states like Kentucky, and racial 
differences in per pupil expenditures were smaller in the border states than elsewhere 
in the South (Jones 1917). 
5.  Black turnout was declining before suffrage restrictions were enacted; see Kous- 
ser (1974,242-43). 
6.  Another way around the obstacle was private support for white public schools. It 
was common in the  late nineteenth  century  South for “patrons”  (parents and other 
interested parties) to provide  supplemental funds when public funds ran out. In this 
manner white parents could be sure that their “tax dollars” (donations) went to support 
schools for white children. 
7. There is considerable debate over the racial incidence of school taxes in the South 
ca.  1910 (Smith 1973; Pritchett  1986). However, there is little question that, even if 
the black  schools were still being subsidized by  whites in  1910, the amount of  the 
subsidy was less after disenfranchisement; see Kousser (1980a). 
8. The effects of disenfranchisement  on school spending in North Carolina have 
also been  investigated;  see  the  valuable  studies  by  Kousser (1980a)  and  Pritchett 
(  1985). 
9. Calculated from figures in States of Louisiana (1879, 12-15). 
10.  A Louisiana “parish’ is the same as a county in other states. 
11.  A regression was also estimated in which the interaction term was allowed to 
have a nonzero coefficient only in the sugar parishes  in which Hair (1969) claimed 
blacks voted freely. Consistent with Hair’s argument, the coefficient of this interaction 
term was positive. The level of statistical significance was somewhat lower, however, 
than in thC equation in the text, suggesting that, in the cotton parishes, the black voter 
was a real threat at the height of the Populist challenge. 
12. Indeed, in light of scholarly discussion of the extent of the fraud (Hair  1969; 
Kousser 1974), the fact that the coefficient has the “correct sign,” let alone approaches 
conventional levels of  statistical significance, is strong evidence of a disenfranchise- 
ment effect. 
13. Chapter 5 shows that the reasoning  was self-serving,  insofar as better black 
schools would have led to higher black attendance rates. 
14.  Quoted in U.S. Bureau of Education (1893, 1079). The superintendent got his 
wish. Except for Atlanta, blacks were fully disenfranchised in Georgia by  1908; see 
Kousser (1974). 
15.  A subsidy from whites to blacks would have been required because per capita 
black  demand  for education  was lower  than per  capita white  demand. Consider a 
school district that opted to open a white high school. According to a strict interpreta- 
tion of separate-but-equal,  the district would have been required to open a black high 
school, regardless of the level of per capita black demand (the results of Chapter 5 
suggest, though, that the level of black demand would not be independent of the exis- 
tence of the black school). As I discuss in Chapter 5, various legal loopholes emerged 
to get around the strict interpretation.  The required  subsidy would have been even 
larger if compensatory doctrine (unequal schools in favor of blacks) had been put into 
place to offset the effects of family background on black school attendance. 
16. Part of the strategy of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 139  Notes to Pages 45-58 
People (NAACP) initially was to force an abandonment of separate-but-equal by con- 
vincing the South that it was too expensive to maintain, if strictly construed; see Chap- 
ter 5. 
17.  The source of this belief, aside from Myrdal’s creed may have been a social 
norm that blacks were entitled to public school funds equal to what they paid in school 
taxes; see Kousser (1980a). 
18. Of course, any given school district might decide to flout the law by not opening 
a black  school but,  as I discuss below, the community then risked losing its black 
residents, which had economic costs. 
19.  For example, state courts in the South consistently ruled against statutes requir- 
ing that school taxes be segregated, that is, taxes paid by  blacks would go to black 
schools, taxes paid by whites to white schools; see Risen (1935). By gerrymandering 
school districts, however, it was frequently possible to get around the restriction,  as 
happened in North Carolina; see Pritchett (1985). 
20.  Following the logic to its conclusion, however, foundation contributions would 
have stimulated more spending on the white schools as well; some of the contributions 
may have substituted for public funds that would have been spent on blacks anyway. 
Moreover, it would make no sense at all for school officials to accept matching grants 
unless they already were committed to supporting the black public schools. Thus, the 
existence of philanthropic contributions cannot answer Myrdal’s paradox in its most 
basic form, although it can explain why improvements in the black schools took place. 
21.  Anderson  (1987) demonstrates  that  many of  the philanthropic officials were 
racist and their motives far from pure. But there is no doubt that philanthropic contri- 
butions expanded educational opportunities for southern black children. 
23.  To  attract aid from the Rosenwald Foundation,  for example, local matching 
funds would have to be raised.  State agents mustered such support from local school 
officials. 
Chapter 4 
1. Because the length of the black school year declined relative to the white school 
year between  1890 and  1910 (Chapter 2), the decline in the black-to-white ratio of 
monthly teacher salaries was somewhat smaller (see Margo 1985). 
2.  A  variation on this  argument  emphasizes racial  differences in grades  taught. 
Black teachers were disproportionately employed in the elementary grades, where sal- 
aries were lower than in high schools, even after accounting for education and experi- 
ence. 
3.  Monthly salaries are used rather than annual salaries in order to control for vari- 
ation across counties in the length of the school year. The purpose of pooling by sex is 
to increase the sample size, because the number of counties in both states are small. 
The number of observations in every state is less than the number of counties (or twice 
the number, in the Florida and Louisiana regressions), because of missing data or be- 
cause a few counties hired only female teachers. 
4.  The additional regressions are reported in Margo (1984b, 314-15). 
5.  Variations in population density across counties may also capture variations in 
the cost of living, which could not be included in the regressions due to data limita- 
tions. 
6.  To correct for heteroscedasticity, each observation was weighted by the square 
root of the number of teachers to which the average salary refers. 
7.  This conclusion is sensitive to how qualifications are measured. White teachers 140  Notes to Pages 58-67 
appear to have received higher returns to education and experience; see Margo (1984b, 
315). 
8.  This data base is part of a larger one constructed for a project on the social and 
economic history of American teachers; see Perlmann and Margo (1989). 
9.  The racial difference in the age-salary profile is  smaller for weekly earnings. 
Evidently, older black teachers worked significantly more weeks (were employed in 
school districts with longer than average school years) than younger black teachers. 
10. The South Atlantic region consists of Delaware, Maryland, the District of Co- 
lumbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. 
States in the East South Central region are Alabama, Mississippi, Kentucky, and Ten- 
nessee. States in the West South Central region are Arkansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, 
and Texas. The greater locational disparity in black salaries suggests that the market 
for black teachers may  have been less efficient spatially than the market for white 
teachers. Additional support for this conclusion is obtained if  dummy variables for 
states are substituted for the regional dummies in the regressions; the coefficient of 
variation of  the black state dummies exceeded the coefficient of variation of the white 
state dummies. 
11. I will return to this point in Chapter 5, when I examine the impact of  separate- 
but-equal. 
12. See Murray (1949,63)  for a list of cases through early 1948 and their outcomes. 
13. This avenue was closed off, however, with the successful resolution of  Morris 
v. Little Rock in 1945, which outlawed “rating systems” as a method of discriminating 
against black teachers; see Marshall (1947,47). 
14. The number of  males employed in high schools also fell proportionately to the 
number of females; see Federal Security Agency, U.S. Office of Education (195  1,83). 
15. Class sizes were computed from U.S.  Department of  Health, Education and 
Welfare (1954, 98). In the elementary grades the average class size (enrollment per 
member of the instructional staff) was 38 in 1942 and 37.3 in 1950. In the high schools 
the average class size was 25.7 in 1942 and 17.4 in 1950. 
16. Total black enrollment in the elementary grades fell by 3 percent between 1942 
and 1950, while total enrollment in high schools rose by  28 percent; see Federal Secu- 
rity Agency, U.S.  Office of Education (1947, 113) and U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (1954, 98). An improvement in the educational qualifications 
of  black teachers vis-a-vis white teachers, which was associated with the increase in 
black high school attendance, is also part of the demand story, and helps explain the 
rise in the black-white salary ratio. Between 1940 and 1950 the proportion of  black 
teachers with 2 years or less of post-high  school training fell by 14 percentage points, 
while the proportion who were college graduates or better increased by 30 percentage 
points; the corresponding figures for white teachers were 1 percentage point and 12 
percentage points (Welch  1973, 43). The black regression coefficients in Table 6.3 
imply that the premium (in logs) for up to 2 years of college was 0.171 and for 4 or 
more years was 0.566 (this lumps persons with 3 years into the “2 year or less cate- 
gory,” which will bias upward the total importance of the changes in educational back- 
ground). The corresponding figures for whites are 0.136 (2 years or less) and 0.40 (4 
years or more). If  these figures are used to weight the changes in educational back- 
ground, the implied increase in the black-white salary ratio is 0.096 = (0.133 [blacks] 
- 0.034  [whites]), or 27 percent of  the actual change from  1940 to  1950 (0.096/ 
0.352). 
17. In log terms, the increase in black salaries (in 1950 dollars) between 1942 and 
1950 was 0.59. If e = -  1, the log of the number of black teachers employed would 
have declined by  0.59 which, in  1950, would have corresponded to a reduction of 
33,000 in instructional staff. If black enrollment had stayed constant (which, I admit, 141  Notes to Pages 67-73 
is doubtful, because overcrowding would have been horrendous), the pupil-staff ratio 
would have been 58 (compared with an actual value of 32.1). 
Chapter 5 
1.  My discussion of Plessy v. Ferguson draws heavily on Lofgren’s (1987) mono- 
graph; see also Woodward (1955). 
2.  Notwithstanding  its modem  notoriety, there is debate whether Plessy  was an 
unexceptional ruling for its time. The conventional wisdom is that there was little in 
Brown’s opinion to excite contemporaries and the decision could have been foreseen 
by  the participants (Lofgren  1987). Recent work by Morgan Kousser (1986, 1988a, 
1988b), however, casts doubt on this view. The opinion was a product of its era: popu- 
lar support for civil rights was at a low ebb in the late nineteenth century, and there was 
little pressure on the justices to vote in favor of Plessy although, in Kousser’s view, 
there was legal precedent to do so. 
3.  Mangum (1940, 79-83)  discusses the various state laws regarding racial segre- 
gation in public schools. 
4.  See Kousser (1980b) for an excellent discussion of Cummins. 
5.  At the time there was a private black high school operating in Augusta; see Kous- 
ser (1980b). 
6.  The import was less extreme because  it is unclear  whether knowledge of the 
decision  was widespread  among school boards.  Further,  as pointed out earlier, the 
number of black public high schools in the South increased anyway after World War 
One. 
7.  See also Schmidt (1982). 
8.  Lloyd Gaines, who had sought to enroll in law school, could not be located after 
the Supreme Court reached  its  decision,  and never directly  benefited; see Tushnet 
9.  Not quife the right statistics, however. The very county and state data that per- 
mitted me to write this monograph would not have been sufficient; the right detail was 
at the school district level, which typically would have to have been collected on site, 
at great expense. 
10.  It was legally sound because of the Supreme Court’s 1886 decision Yick Wo  v. 
Hopkins which,  in theory, linked unconstitutionality to the administration of racially 
based statutes; see Tushnet (1987, 25). It was cheaper because the equalization suits 
would have been brought in numerous localities, most very distant from NAACP head- 
quarters in New York. 
11. That is, as long as the Court was receptive to the argument that de jure segre- 
gation was morally wrong, there could be no defense of compensating inequalities. 
12. I do  not wish to imply that no further moral indictment is possible. A case could 
be made, for example, that separate-but-equal,  strictly enforced, would have wasted 
resources (unnecessary duplication of school facilities); or, alternatively, would have 
required so large a redistribution of income from whites to blacks that it would not 
have been too costly to achieve (that is, there would have been strong incentives for 
whites to prevent the redistribution from taking place). 
13. For a good discussion of the difficulties involved, see Hanushek (1986). 
14.  Orazem (1987,714) makes a similar point. 
15.  For a contrary view, see Kiefer and Phillips (1988) and Donohue and Heckman 
(1989). 
16.  A  recent paper by  Card and Krueger (1990) persuasively demonstrates that 
long-term improvements in the quality of schooling (which they measure by class size, 
(1987,70-77). 142  Notes to Pages 73-82 
the length of the school year, and similar variables) did appreciably raise the rate of 
return to schooling. 
17. The major exception is Bond (1934). who conducted a number of pioneering 
studies of  racial differences in educational  achievement, but who did not provide  a 
quantitative estimate of the impact of separate-but-equal. 
18.  As the state-level regressions in Chapter 2 showed, compulsory schooling laws 
had only a minor effect on black attendance rates; see also Landes and Solmon (1972). 
Orazem (1987) uses a household model in his study of separate-but-equal and Mary- 
land test scores. 
19.  The variable refers to attendance in any type of school, not just public schools. 
But for the  age group in question  (5-16),  the majority must have been enrolled  in 
public elementary schools, because private school enrollments were a tiny fraction of 
total enrollments in the South in 1900, concentrated at the high school level (that is, 
older children). 
20.  Occupational  status (available from the  1900 census tape) is constructed  by 
attaching to each occupation a weight derived from 1950 income data (the higher the 
average income in the occupation, the higher the weight). Thus occupational status is 
a proxy for income. 
21.  The school variables were drawn from the published reports of state superinten- 
dents of four states in 1900: North and South Carolina, Alabama, and Florida (data for 
a fifth state, Texas, could not be successfully matched to the  1900 census sample). 
Observations for the four states from the  1900 census tape make up the sample ana- 
lyzed. 
22.  Strictly speaking, positive coefficients could be expected only for children who 
were at the margin between attending and not attending school. For children already in 
school, it is possible that an improvement in average school characteristics could lower 
school attendance. This is not just a theoretical quibble.  Black children in northern 
cities could  complete more grades in less time than southern children,  because the 
schools were better. Consequently attendance rates of older urban children were some- 
times lo,wer in the North (and in some southern cities). On black education in the North 
at the turn of the century, see the important recent book by Perlmann (1988). 
23.  Because most children  attended one-teacher  schools, variations in class size 
may capture variations in the availability of schooling, thus accounting for the insignif- 
icant coefficients of the school density variable. 
24.  Because the regression does not control for within-county differences in school 
characteristics, it is also likely that the urban dummy is partially capturing the positive 
effect of better urban schools on school attendance. 
25.  In performing the calculation using the black coefficients, I ignore the negative 
coefficient of  school density (see Table 5.2). If the true impact of school density on 
black attendance were negative,  the calculated impact would be  biased upward, but 
this would simply reinforce the conclusion that racial differences in school character- 
istics do  not explain all of the attendance gap. 
26.  The calculation is a “partial equilibrium” one. If the equal part of separate-but- 
equal had been enforced, someone would have had to pay for it. Because strict enforce- 
ment would have probably  increased the white share of the school tax burden (see 
Chapter 3), white after-tax incomes would have fallen relative to black after-tax in- 
comes, further lowering the racial attendance gap. 
27.  Racial differences in child characteristics and geographic location explain only 
a small amount of the racial attendance gap; see Margo (1987). 
28.  To estimate per capita incomes at the county level, I devised a procedure that 
applied fixed income weights from the 1950 census to urban, rural farm, and rural non- 
farm population shares; see Margo (1986a, 795). Because of the errors inherent in this 143  Notes to Pages 82-93 
procedure,  I tested  the sensitivity of the results by estimating regressions including 
urban and rural nonfarm population shares instead of the income variable. Urban in- 
comes were higher on average than rural nonfarm incomes, so an increase in the urban 
share should have a larger positive effect on the literacy rate than an increase in the 
proportion urban. This turned out to be the case. The additional regressions can be 
found in Margo (1986a, 796). 
29.  The fixed effects estimator corresponds to a regression with dummy variables 
for counties and years. On the random effects estimator, see Maddala (1977). 
30.  School capital was typically valued at its historical production cost; privately 
owned buildings used as schools (e.g., churches) were frequently not included in the 
valuation. Consequently the insignificant coefficients may reflect measurement error. 
3 1. Due to the difficulties of interpreting the coefficients of the school capital and 
percentage one-teacher schools variables (the coefficients are either the “wrong” sign 
or are statistically insignificant),  the calculations do not equalize the value of school 
capital and the percentage one-teacher schools. 
32.  Margo (1986a, 799) reports a regression of state-level data in  1930 showing 
that, holding constant school characteristics and school attendance, child literacy was 
positively related to adult literacy. 
33.  Orazem  (1987)  also  estimated  regressions  combining  the  black  and  white 
schools together (including a race dummy), with no substantive effect on the results. 
34.  Orazem (1987,  720) also estimated  race-specific attendance equations, con- 
cluding that equalization of  school inputs completely explained the racial attendance 
gap. It is likely that his omission of family background variables accounts for the larger 
impact of separate-but-equal than in my analysis of school attendance in Section 5.2 
(which did control for family background). 
35.  The inclusion of dummy variables for counties corresponds to the fixed effects 
estimator of Section 5.3. 
36.  If the fixed effects coefficients are used, the average reduction is 27 percent. 
Chapter 6 
1.  Figures for adult males can be constructed for the entire country from published 
census volumes (as in Smith 1984), but not for regions. 
2.  Over two-thirds of the black professionals were schoolteachers or clergymen in 
the 1940 sample. In  1930 there was one black teacher for every 194 southern blacks 
and one black clergyman for every 495 blacks; the corresponding ratio for lawyers was 
one for every 21,472 blacks (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1935,292). 
3.  In the sample drawn from the 1940 census tape, 87  percent of the fifty-eight black 
managers labored in trade, financial and business services, or personal services. Only 
two were employed in manufacturing, compared with  12 percent of  southern white 
managers. Eighty-one percent of the black managers were self-employed, and 79 per- 
cent of  these worked  in wholesale  and retail trade.  None of the non-self-employed 
black managers worked in southern manufacturing;  15 percent of non-self-employed 
white managers did. 
4. See Goldin (1990) for an application of this index to measure employment seg- 
regation between men and women. 
5. The indices would be invariant to the number of categories (below the one-digit 
level) if  and only if the signs of the racial differences within categories were the same 
as the sign at the one-digit  level. For example, if  the white proportion with skilled 
blue-collar jobs exceeded the black proportion, the same would have to be true for 
every skilled trade. Since this is unlikely, the values of the indices are lower bounds. 144  Notes to Pages 94-96 
6.  Compared  with  Smith’s (1984) indices, Becker’s are based on fewer occupa- 
tional categories, a broader age grouping, and are not cohort specific. However, Beck- 
er’s index of relative black status in the North shows an increase before 1950, which 
suggests that regional differences were fundamental to the behavior of the aggregate 
black-white earnings ratio prior to World War Two. 
7.  Goldin (1990) shows that, prior to World War Two, many large firms had “color 
bars” prohibiting the employment of blacks in office work and other white-collar jobs. 
8.  Models  of  “statistical”  discrimination  help  explain  the  persistence  of  social 
norms  involving employment; see Starrett (1976), Lundberg and Startz (1983) and 
Akerlof (1985). In Lundberg and Startz’s model, for example, there are two population 
groups, W and B; firms base hiring decisions on the expected productivities of workers 
which,  in turn,  are assumed  to be a weighted  average of individual characteristics 
(e.g., human capital) and the average characteristics of the worker’s racial group. It is 
assumed that the weight attached by firms to group characteristics is greater for the B 
group than for the W group. Given this assumption, individual members of the B group 
have less incentive to invest in human capital than do members of W; and over time, 
the average level of human capital in the B group will be less than the average level in 
the W group (which, in turn, reinforces the initial beliefs of employers about the rela- 
tive productivities of the two groups). 
9.  Roosevelt’s order was in response to a threatened march on Washington to be led 
by  A.  Philip Randolph, president  of the Brotherhood  of Sleeping Car Porters, the 
purpose of which was to demand an end to hiring discrimination in defense plants; see 
Vatter (1985, 132). 
10.  Given the categorical nature of the dependent variable, a multinomial logit or 
probit model might be preferred to the linear probability model. The multinomial logit 
and probit models,  however, are impractical because  of  the large sample sizes and 
number of estimations to be performed. I did, however, estimate certain regressions 
(the agricultural participation regressions) using binomial logit analysis, and all of the 
regressions were estimated using discriminant analysis (Amemiya 198  1). Discriminant 
function estimates of multinomial logit parameters are biased, but the biases are typi- 
cally small,  and discriminant  analysis  is much cheaper than maximum  likelihood. 
None of the substantive findings were affected. See also Heckman and Payner (1989), 
who use the linear probability model in their very similar analysis of racial differences 
in employment in South Carolina during the twentieth century. 
11.  Census region and urbanization are included because, as discussed in the text, 
the extent of the nonfarm economy in the South varied geographically. Marital status 
is included to control for the possibility (suggested by Wright 1986) that certain occu- 
pations (e.g., unskilled nonfarm labor) were avoided by married men because wages 
in the occupation were too low to support a family. Years of schooling (194  and 1950) 
is highest grade completed. Because the census did not ask a separate question about 
highest grade attended in 1940 (the 1950 census did), it is possible that some persons 
in 1940 reported their highest grade attended instead of highest grade completed, thus 
overstating their completed schooling level. Experiments with the 1950 census sample 
indicate that the mean racial difference in years of schooling (for adult males) was only 
slightly larger if measured by highest grade completed than by highest grade attended. 
Thus the substantive conclusions of the chapter regarding the effects of schooling on 
labor market outcomes are unaffected by the use of highest grade completed (as mea- 
sured by the census) in the 1940 and 1950 regressions. 
12. In light of  the cohort differences found in the previous section,  it would be 
better to estimate age-specific regressions,  rather than include age as an independent 
variable.  Unfortunately, once the dependent variable is disaggregated into one-digit 
industry and occupation groups, the sample sizes are too small to disaggregate by age. 145  Notes to Pages 96-106 
13.  Let ai  be the coefficient of the race variable in, say, the ith occupation. The 
segregation index is Sla,l (since a,  = b  -  w,,  controlling for other factors). 
14. The regression coefficients were used to predict race-specific values of the in- 
dustry or occupational probabilities, the pi’s, given the particular values assumed for 
the independent variables (e.g., that the mean value of years of schooling was the same 
for whites and blacks). 
15.  In the 1940  and 1950 census samples, “teachers” were classified in the “profes- 
sional services” industry, which accounts for black overrepresentation in both years. 
Because most of the teachers were employees of local governments,  had they been 
correctly classified,  blacks would have been more underrepresented  in government 
employment than as measured by census data. 
16. Because the 1940 and 1950 regressions use a more accurate measure of educa- 
tional attainment, it is likely that the estimated increase in employment segregation is 
biased downward. The industry and occupation regressions for 1940 and 1950 were re- 
estimated with a proxy for literacy instead of years of schooling. A person was deemed 
literate if his educational attainment was greater than two years, and illiterate other- 
wise.  The values of the segregation indices computed from the race coefficients of 
these regressions were 36.4 in 1940 and 35.9 in 1950, both exceeding the values in 
Table 6.5. 
17.  Bond (1939, 339-44)  reported the results of standardized tests conducted in the 
1920s showing that black third and sixth graders in Alabama and Louisiana scored a 
full grade below national norms, controlling for the age of the pupil; not controlling 
for age, the gap was three years, which is the basis for the adjustment in the text. A 
similar adjustment for school quality was made by Heckman and Payner (1989).  A 
three-year adjustment is not restrictive; a larger adjustment, say five years, would not 
alter the conclusions. 
18.  Calculations  equating white  and black urbanization  and regional  population 
shares reached a similar conclusion. 
19.  “Earnings” here refer to wage and salary earnings; self-employment income is 
excluded. Cwsequently the regression sample excludes a fairly large portion of agri- 
cultural employment in both 1940 and 1950. Because the decline in agricultural wage 
labor among blacks during the 1940s was greater than the overall decline in agricultural 
employment (compare the means in Table 6.6 with Table 6. l),  the earnings data over- 
state the improvement in relative black incomes (including self-employment income) 
in the South between 1940 and 1950. 
20.  The sectoral differences in earnings are not adjusted for nonwage benefits. Farm 
laborers, however, received more nonwage benefits (e.g., food, housing) than nonfarm 
workers.  Adjusting for such benefits would reduce the size of  the sectoral gap and 
therefore the importance of the sectoral shift. On sectoral wage gaps before 1950, see 
Alston and Hatton (1989) and Williamson and Lindert (1980). 
21.  The age range 25 to 64  was chosen because, for these cohorts, no adjustment 
for relative school quality is warranted; see note 22 in this chapter. 
22.  No adjustment  for relative  (black-to-white)  school quality is appropriate be- 
cause, for the birth cohorts included in the regressions (1876-80  to 1921-25),  no im- 
provement in quality took place for the average black member of the 1940 and 1950 
samples; the average birth year of blacks in the 1940 sample was 1900 and in the 1950 
sample it was 1909. However, the impact of changing racial differences in schooling is 
biased downward, because no adjustment is made for “ungraded school bias” (Chapter 
2). The 1940 census understated the educational attainments of blacks born in the late 
nineteenth century; the bias is less in 1950 because these cohorts are a smaller share of 
the 1950 sample. If all blacks born before 1900 were educated in ungraded schools and 
the adjustment for ungraded school bias reduces mean educational attainment by two 146  Notes to Pages 106-13 
years, then the reduction in racial differences in years of schooling between 1940 and 
1950 would be -0.51  years (instead of  -0.26  years; see Table 6.6). Thus adjusting 
for ungraded school bias among blacks would approximately double the explanatory 
power of changing racial differences in schooling (Panel C, Table 6.6). I regard this as 
an upper bound to the true adjustment for ungraded school bias because many southern 
whites, too, attended ungraded schools. 
23.  Freeman (1973) argued that educational discrimination slowed the narrowing 
of racial income differences by reducing the supply of black employers in the South, 
who would have hired black workers. The results of the chapter support Freeman’s 
hypothesis. 
24.  Without  the public use samples, it would have been impossible to calculate 
segregation indices controlling for racial differences in schooling. 
25.  The importance I attach to social norms may be overstated. It is possible that 
census samples for 1920 and 1930, were they available, would show that the increase 
in employment segregation was primarily a consequence of setbacks during the Great 
Depression. On the other hand, the data in Table 6.1 show that the lag in the black shift 
out of agriculture predated the 1930s (see Table 6. I). 
Chapter 7 
1.  See Epstein (1918), U.S. Department of Labor (1919), Kennedy (1930), Kiser 
(1932), Vickery (1969), Henri  (1975), Gill (1979),  Johnson and Campbell (1981), 
Fligstein (1981), Gottlieb (1987), and Grossman (1989). 
2.  A major exception is the important study by Leiberson (1978), who applied for- 
ward survival techniques to aggregate census data from 1890 to 1950 to show that net 
migration of southern blacks was higher among literates than illiterates. My analysis 
differs from Leiberson’s in two ways: the measure of  migration I use is gross and the 
data referato  individuals.  Gross measures of migration are preferable to net measures 
because migration theory, economic or otherwise, refers to gross flows, not net. Be- 
cause the data I use refer to individuals, it is possible to control simultaneously for 
characteristics other than schooling, which cannot be done with aggregate data. 
3.  Another possibility is that there may have been a greater census undercount of 
less-educated  blacks in northern  cities  than  in the rural  South, but  the  differential 
would have to have been very large to account for the migration-schooling relation- 
ship. 
4.  Some persons migrated to attend high school or college in the North and ended 
up  staying.  Middle-class  black parents  in the upper South, for example, sent their 
teenage offspring to Chicago to attend high school; see Grossman (1989). 
5.  The variables for 1900 and 1910 are age, age squared, gender, literacy, family 
size, relationship to head of household, marital status, region of birth within the South, 
and whether the person’s parents were interstate migrants. The last variable was in- 
cluded to test for migration of young children with families or for an intergenerational 
effect, but none was found. The variables for 1940 and 1950 are the same, except for 
the  following  differences.  In  1940 and  1950 the  schooling  variables are years  of 
schooling  and years  of  schooling  squared,  and parents’  interstate  migration is ex- 
cluded. In 1950, veteran status was added. The substantive results are not affected if 
family size, relationship to head of household, and marital status (which, for migrants, 
are observed after the move) are excluded. 
6. Schooling could be a proxy for ability or some other unobserved characteristic 
(“motivation”), but the census samples, because they are cross sectional, cannot ad- 
dress this issue (but see Sec. 7.3). 147  Notes to Pages 115-18 
7.  For a contrary view, see Fligstein (1981). 
8.  Consider the calculation  for  1940. Suppose that, for black schooling to equal 
white schooling (including the quality of schooling), the black schooling distribution 
(as in Table 7.2) would have had to be: 0-1  years of schooling, 3.4%; 2-4,  0%;  5-8, 
20%; 9-12,  60%; 213, 16.6%. This corresponds to an increase in the mean years of 
schooling for blacks so that it equalled the mean for whites plus two additional years. 
Under this assumption, the predicted black migration rate in  1940 would be 28.1% 
(instead of 23.9; see Table 7.5). 
9.  The state dummies control for geographic factors that influenced the extent of the 
migration (e.g., distance to the North, literacy rates, percentage nonfarm employment, 
wage differentials, and so forth). 
10. The regression specification can be criticized because it excludes schooling (al- 
though variations in black literacy rates would be captured in the state dummies). To 
address the criticism, I estimated a logit regression using a sample of southern-born 
adult blacks from the  1910 census tape,  in which the lagged outmigration from the 
state of birth was included as an independent variable, as well as literacy. The logit 
coefficient of lagged migration implied a partial probability change of 0.88 (the dpldr, 
analogous to the autoregressive coefficient of the state-level regression). 
11.  The coefficients of the year dummies are also of interest; in particular, the value 
of  the  1930 dummy (0.043)  indicates that slightly more than half of  the migration 
between  1910 and  1930 was due to “trend” factors (e.g., schooling, falling costs of 
migration, etc.). 
12. In fact, the coefficient of the lagged migration rate is insignificantly different 
from one. This implies that the long-run effect of a shock would be to raise perma- 
nently the proportion of black migrants (if the coefficient were less than one, the black 
migration rate would eventually return back to its original level). 
13.  On the other hand, if black schooling levels had been higher earlier in the cen- 
tury, the autoregression implies that more blacks would have left subsequently. The 
autoregressive coefficient can be used to calculate how big this “feedback’ effect would 
have been. Suppose, for example, the literacy rate of adult black males in 1910 had 
equalled its 1940 value. According to Table 7.5, the 1910 migration rate would have 
then been  1.86 percentage points higher than its actual value. This increase, in turn, 
would have caused an increase in the migration rate in 1920, 1930, and 1940 (through 
the feedback effect). The total increase in the migration rate (between 1910 and 1940) 
can be shown to be 2.93 percentage points, or 34.1 percent ( = 2.93/8.5) of the actual 
increase in the migration rate of adult males between 1910 and 1940 (see Table 7.2). 
14. It is also consistent with “learning” by firms; after experimenting with black 
workers (because of a shock like a war) and finding the experiment to be successful, 
the  firm permanently  raises  its demand for black  labor in the future; see Whatley 
(1990). 
15. The cost-of-living adjustments are described in the notes to Table 7.6. No ad- 
justment is made for nonwage payments, which were quite common among farm la- 
borers (Alston and Hatton  1989). Including these payments, however, would narrow 
further the regional difference in wages at the lowest schooling levels (because farm 
laborers were the least schooled occupation), and, hence, would have no effect on the 
substantive conclusions. 
16. If data for all northern  blacks  were used  (instead of data for migrants), the 
substantive contrasts in Table 7.6 would be unchanged. The North-South wage gap is 
usually calculated in this manner; see, for example, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
(1986). 
17. In Margo (1988b), I specify and estimate an econometric model of the Great 
Migration, using individual-level data from the 1940 census tape. The model consists 
of three equations: 148  Notes to Pages 118-24 
In w,,,  = Xp,,,  + E,,, 
(2)  In w,  = Xp,, + E, 
(3)  I*  = p(ln w,,,  -  In w,) + Zci  + 6 
Equations (1) and (2) are earnings functions for migrants and nonmigrants. Equation 
(3) is an index function: if I* >  0, the person migrates; if I* <  0, the person stays. The 
X's  are variables that influence earnings, and the Z's are variables that influence the 
costs of migration. Schooling is included in both X and Z;  that is, it has an impact on 
migration indirectly through its effects on earnings, and it has a direct impact by affect- 
ing the costs of migration (or the nonpecuniary benefits). The model is completed by 
assuming that the error terms (the E'S and 6) are joint normally distributed. 
Equations (1)-(3)  are estimated in a three-step procedure (see Maddala 1983). First, 
(1) and (2) are substituted into (3) and a reduced-form probit is estimated. The probit 
coefficients are  used  to  calculate selectivity-bias  correction  terms,  which  are then 
added to (1) and (2) in a least squares regression (selectivity bias is present unless E, 
and E,,  are uncorrelated, which is highly unlikely). The regression coefficients are used 
to calculate the expected earnings gains of migration (In w,,,  - In  wJ.  Finally, the 
structural probit (e.g. 133) is estimated, included the expected earningsgain. 
The model was estimated using a sample of  1,147 southern-born black males (ages 
14 and over), 284 of whom were migrants.  The dependent variable of the earnings 
functions was the person's weekly wage. In principle, the model's parameters are iden- 
tified as long as one variable in X is excluded from Z, but in practice, it proved neces- 
sary to include occupational and broad sectoral (manufacturing, agriculture) dummies 
in the earnings functions. In effect, the specification implies that black migrants would 
have worked in the same occupation and economic sector in both regions, a factually 
incorrect assumption for many migrants.  However, the estimate of p was insignifi- 
cantly different from one, and the coefficient of schooling in the structural probit was 
positive and statistically significant. The higher were the expected earnings gains, the 
more likely a black would migrate; but, holding constant the expected earnings gains, 
schooling had a positive effect on the propensity to leave the South. These econometric 
results, then, are consistent with the conclusions reached in the text. 
18.  The decline in the earnings gap at the high school level is larger than that re- 
ported in U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1986, 81), but the commission's study did 
not adjust for regional cost-of-living differences. Another interpretation of the decline 
is that skill differentials were higher in the South, and, indeed, had been since the 
antebellum period; see Margo and Villaflor (1987). 
19.  It is also possible that economic opportunities for better-educated blacks were 
greater in the North, in ways not fully reflected in earnings; for example, the chances 
of finding a blue- or white-collar job. 
20.  A large colIection of responses appear in Foner and Lewis (1980, 259-81), 
from which the examples in the chapter are selected. 
21.  For example, in the 1940 sample used in Panel C of Table 7.7 below, the aver- 
age educational attainment of non-southern-born blacks was 8.4 years, compared with 
7 years among southern-born black migrants. 
22.  It is noteworthy that the proportion of black migrants in white-collar jobs ex- 
ceeded the proportion of blacks in white-collar jobs in the South (see Chapter 6), which 
is consistent with the schooling-migration relationship. 
23.  In order to ensure a large enough sample of Recent migrants, the sample defi- 
nition was extended to include all black males in the labor force (ages 14 and over); 
see Margo (1989). The percentage differentials were calculated from the logs of the 
variables, so the sample definition excludes persons who reported no wage and salary 
earnings in 1939, and who worked zero weeks. 149  Notes to Pages 124-26 
24.  Because there were over ten times as many Lifetime migrants as there were 
Recent migrants, the average earnings of black  migrants (Lifetime and Recent) ex- 
ceeded the average earnings of non-southern blacks. A similar overall difference (not 
shown) was found using the 1950 census sample. 
25.  Poorly educated non-southern blacks, too, were atypical of the population from 
which they  were drawn.  Their earnings may have been unusually low, biasing  the 
comparison in favor of southern black migrants. 
26.  The black-white earnings and wage ratios are biased upwards because no ad- 
justment has been made for the 1939 earnings limit (which was $5,000). Proportion- 
ately more whites earned above the limit than did blacks. For such adjustments, see 
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1986, 128). 
27. The result  is consistent  with Becker (1957, 113), who found an increase in 
black-to-white occupational status in the North from 1910 to 1950. 
28.  According to the 1910 census sample (see Chapter 2), 60 percent of southern 
black males (ages 20-64)  were literate. According to Higgs (1971, 424), every male 
immigrant group except for two, Portuguese and Turkish, had a higher literacy rate. 
Higgs’s figures pertain  to 1909, but the contrast would be  larger if  late nineteenth 
century data (e.g., 1880) were used. 
29.  They also had lower unemployment.  A regression analysis of the 1910 census 
sample shows that, among foreign-born adult men, literacy in any language reduced 
the annual frequency of unemployment (the probability of experiencing unemployment 
in a year’s time)  by 5.6 percentage  points (t-statistic  = 5.6). The ability to speak 
English also reduced the unemployment frequency, but by a smaller amount, 2.3  per- 
centage points (t-statistic  = 2.6). The regression included age, city size, region of 
residence,  years in the United  States,  marital  status,  and a nonwhite  (i.e.,  Asian) 
dummy. If one-digit industry and occupation dummies are added, the literacy coeffi- 
cient remains significantly negative, but the English-speaking coefficient no longer is 
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